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00:00:00

Dr. Squire Brown: Today is August 24, 2006. We are talking with Dr.
Keith Richey, former Director of Flight Dynamics Lab Directorate in the
Air Force Wright Aeronautical Laboratories at Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base (1995-1997). This interview is being conducted in the studios of the
Center for Teaching and Learning at Wright State University, as part of
the Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project. The interviewer is
Squire Brown. Thank you so much for talking with us today, Dr. Richey.

00:00:38

Dr. G. Keith Richey: Please call me Keith.

00:00:41

Brown: Dr. Richey, you were a participant in the development of
technologies for the Air Force during several decades of the Cold War.
Will you please provide a synopsis of your professional career, beginning
with your university education, and perhaps include remarks on why you
chose the engineering profession.

00:01:01

Richey: All right. I graduated from Ohio State University with a
Bachelor’s degree in the summer of 1961. I was going to be a chemical
engineer, I thought, but my first class in chemistry at Ohio State convinced
me that I didn’t like chemistry very well. So I quickly switched to
aeronautical engineering. I had always had some interest in airplanes. My
father worked in an airplane factory, and I had taken some tours of what
was then North American, or Rockwell, Aviation and was kind of
fascinated with the airplanes. I didn’t know a whole lot about airplanes,
but aeronautical research seemed to be interesting. It was in the late ‘50s
when I was at Ohio State, and we were into the Cold War and the
beginnings of the space arena and so forth, so that was interesting.
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I graduated from Ohio State in ’61. It was a good time for
aeronautical engineers. I had about seven job offers. I actually chose the
lowest paying offer I had to come to Wright-Patterson, to what was then
the Flight Dynamics Laboratory. And the reason for that was that I
wanted to work in an area that I thought I could make a bit of a difference.
And I think I believed—and still do—that the government laboratories
provided an opportunity for a young engineer to get in right away into
some projects, whereas with industry, I was concerned that I would be in a
large pool of designers and so forth, and I didn’t want to do that. And our
family was from Ohio, so there was an attraction to stay within the Ohio
area.
So in ’61, I came to work at what was then part of the Aeronautical
Systems Division, and we had a very long office title, about seven
different letters, but that was just before, in ’61, the laboratories were
removed from the Aeronautical Systems Division and put into what was
called the Research and Technology Directorate of then Air Force Systems
Command. This is about 1962. I enrolled part-time in a master’s degree
program, actually conducted right here at Wright State in the one building
on the Wright State campus at that time and took classes from professors
that came over from Columbus for Ohio State. Dr. John Lee from the
Aero Department at Ohio State was my principal master’s advisor. And in
’65, then, I received a master’s degree from Ohio State.
From ‘65 to ’70, I was primarily involved with airframe propulsion
integration in the Flight Dynamics Laboratory, and I’ll get back to that a
little bit later. In 1970, then, I was awarded a program from the Air Force,
what’s called long-term, full-time training, in which in the spring of ’70, I
went to the University of Michigan for two years in residence, came back
and then three years later finished up my doctorate from the University of
Michigan. And that was my educational background: ’61, ’65, and ’75
for degrees.
00:04:28

Brown: Your initial assignment was to one of the Air Force laboratories,
the Flight Dynamics Laboratory. When you arrived there, was it apparent
to you that you were a participant in the Cold War? And if so, how did the
laboratory leadership convey to you your role in the nation’s defense?

00:04:50

Richey: Well, we were certainly aware from the beginning that we were
an Air Force Laboratory and concerned with the Air Force mission. We
were, of course, in research. At that time in the early ‘60s when I first
joined the laboratory, we were primarily involved in research which would
go beyond the Cold War, most of it. We were involved quite a bit in the
early days of supersonic combustion ramjets, in one of the cycles of the
so-called aerospace plane programs. Dyna-Soar had just been cancelled,
and the Air Force was looking to what they would do in space access or in
very high-speed flight—hypersonics—and so I was in a group of inlet
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propulsion specialists that was concerned with primarily the inlet system
for the supersonic combustion ramjet type of vehicle.
However, one of my first assignments, I can think back, involved a
Cold War system that was never built. It was called “SLAM/Pluto,” a
very interesting system. The engine for SLAM/Pluto was a nuclear
ramjet. Now, it was never built, but it was quite a capable system, and it
delivered hydrogen bombs, so that tells you it was a Cold War system. It
was to fly at Mach 3 at sea level. Now this is really difficult. It takes a lot
of thrust to fly Mach 3 at sea level. But I was involved with a project that
had to do with the inlet system for this missile, which would fly at Mach 3
on the deck. And it was a very unusual inlet. We called it the “double
sugar scoop” inlet, and it was what’s called isentropic double
compression, but it was designed for Mach 3. So that kind of even then,
even though it wasn’t said, “This is a Cold War system,” it kind of
reminded me that it was. That was in the early days.
So the lab management, they didn’t drill into us that, you know, we
are, in the laboratory, we’re on the front line of something for the then
Cold War—this is in the early ‘60s—but we certainly knew that we were
in a military organization and had a military mission, and whatever the
threat might be, that was what we were to address.
00:07:20

Brown: As we speak of technology this morning, perhaps it would be
useful for the record to define technology. Today, 2006, the term
technology has entered American vocabulary in a variety of ways, but in
this time period of the Cold War, in the 1960s, how was technology
defined, and was that a definition that changed over the years?

00:07:47

Richey: I don’t think it really changed. In the laboratory, we were
involved with what was called applied research, which in parlance of
budgets is called 6.2. In applied research, if a project became larger or
needed a demonstration of technology, it would move into 6.3, advanced
development. But I was primarily involved in, in most of my career,
particularly in the early ‘60s, in exploratory development or applied
research, 6.2. And so this is not basic research as we think about it. But it
is certainly applying principles of science to a project. In my case it was
primarily the propulsion integration aspects and other aerodynamic
characteristics of fighter and some hypersonic aircraft. We didn’t do
much in the early ‘60s on transports, didn’t do too much in bombers, but
primarily what you would call fighter-attack aircraft.
So I don’t think the definition has changed in the laboratory.
Basically it starts with applied research and then moves into development.
It is R&D, but in the technology sense, it’s pretty well up on the learning
curve.

00:09:09

Brown: I would like to ask you a question regarding the origins of an
idea, the very beginnings of a technology. Some scholars have suggested
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that successful technology development is characterized by a network of
participants, perhaps a peer-to-peer network rather than the classical
hierarchical structure that we commonly associate with large
organizations, particularly military organizations such as the Air Force.
What was your impression of the path of a technology from concept and
maturity?
00:09:47

Richey: Well, I think it is more of the peer-to-peer. You know, we have a
lot of smart people in the laboratory. I was pleased I was able to work
with a lot of smart people, and they had good ideas on their own, but we
also would network with engineers in industry, with NASA, sometimes
with the Navy, even from time to time with scientists in other parts of the
world, particularly Europe at the time. And you would come up with an
idea, and you’d say, well, that would make sense, and also would fit the
Air Force mission, for whatever type of system we were considering. So
we always had the application in mind. A good example was the twodimensional nozzle, which came up later on. That was an idea that mostly
came out of NASA but then we took it several steps further in
collaboration with NASA to eventually flight test it on the F-15 and then a
version of that ended up in the F-22 Raptor fighter as we see it today.
So very little top down. You know, the principles and the
guidance of where the direction was came from top down, but most of the
technology ideas came out of either people in the laboratory themselves or
from a peer-to-peer interaction or from some article written by a scientist
anywhere in the world; we might pick up an idea through the AIAA or
something like that and say now let’s apply that idea to something the Air
Force might be interested in. And through a combination of in-house
research and contracted research, then, we would develop the idea. Most
of our work was through contractors. We did some work in-house. We
did some testing in-house. We did some analysis. But the bulk of our
product development in technology, if you will, came through contracted
research and development, which we—the laboratory engineers—would
review, monitor, and oversee.

00:11:55

Brown: To the public at large, they understand that the Air Force acquires
weapon systems through these defense contractors. Could you perhaps
elaborate a little bit more on the relationship between the Air Force and
these contractors, and to particularly address the question of why it was
necessary for the Air Force to have laboratories at Wright-Patterson?
Why could not we rely solely upon these commercial firms for all of our
technology, aircraft, and missiles?

00:12:28

Richey: Well the relationship with the contractors was always very good.
It was collegial. Certainly, we wanted them to do a good job when they
got on contract, and they wanted to do a good job. They wanted to make a
profit, of course, for the company. But in the area of exploratory
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development and applied research, the engineers and the contractors, they
just liked to do technology work. And they weren’t really concerned
whether it was going to make a big profit for the company or result in a
product. They knew it had application, but we and they were involved in
research, so it was a collaboration. And the engineers and the lab worked
with the contractors for discussion, for dialogue, and for guidance of the
contracted program.
And the reason that the laboratory is important is to know what
direction to go, what contracted programs to initiate, to steer, and then to
apply. And also to then transport that knowledge back into the system
developers and what was called the XR community at the time, in ASD,
the advanced concepts people, so they could look at these technologies
and see how they might apply to future systems. Plus the fact that in the
laboratories, as I said before, ideas were bubbling up and ideas were being
discussed with the contractor engineers, so it was pretty much a peer type
of relationship. And, you know, we would argue and discuss and go back
and forth, but it was all in a professional and collegial way.
So it was a good mix of the talents in the lab and the talents in the
industry. Without the lab, I think that it would have been more serendipity
as to what would happen, and I don’t think the Air Force would have had
as much return on its investment, be it contract or be it in-house. As I said
before, the fraction of the Air Force dollars in R&D was probably about
ten percent in-house and about ninety percent contracted at the time. So
even if you took the ten percent and reduced it to zero, you wouldn’t save
a whole lot of money, but that interaction was a lot of “oil in the gears”
that made things, I think, run pretty smoothly.
00:14:55

Brown: Continuing in the context of your career and your work, we’re
talking about the Cold War, which was commonly defined as a period of
political and military rivalry between the United States and the Soviet
Union. How did that rivalry manifest itself in the laboratory projects?
And did you specifically consider Soviet technologies in formulating your
work?

00:15:20

Richey: We did, particularly in my research. In the mid-‘60s—I
mentioned the work in hypersonics that was in somewhat response to a
threat, but it was a far future threat—about in the mid-1960s, though, the
Air Force decided that it needed more research in a lower supersonic
regime, particularly in the Mach 2 or Mach 3 arena, and so they
diminished the funding for hypersonic research. Hypersonic research, as
you know, Squire, kind of goes up and down. That was one of the down
periods.
But there was increased emphasis, then, in the mid-‘60s, in socalled TACAIR. What was then the Tactical Air Command was bringing
on some new systems. They were coming out of the F-105 and the
Vietnam War was on, and particularly the F-111 sparked an interest, a
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renewed interest in airframe propulsion integration, and I can elaborate on
that in a little bit. But that certainly was a Cold War system, the F-111,
because it was designed to fly below the radar, on the deck, at high
subsonic or even transonic speeds, and below the so-called threat radar,
and of course had a high-altitude mission as well above any Soviet
surface-to-air missile threat. So that we were now seeing, at least
indirectly in the areas of research we were doing, the impact of the Soviet
threat.
We would also receive intelligence briefings. I had a clearance,
and we would, through the old Foreign Technology Division, be privy
sometimes to things they were showing in their research and even had a
chance to go over and look at some material that they had received by
various means of Soviet aircraft to get an idea of what the Soviet Air
Force was up to. Our impression at the time was the Soviets in the aircraft
business were unique in some cases, but they weren’t too much advanced
over what we had. But they were certainly formidable in terms of the way
they applied their aircraft.
00:17:46

Brown: If I might, let me continue to ask questions along this line of the
United States in comparison with the Soviet Union. The history of the
engineering organizations at Wright-Patterson provides numerous
examples of new technologies that were emerging and finding application
on combat aircraft, applications that would make them superior to a
potential adversary such as the Soviet Union. What were some other
examples of technologies in the Cold War that provided the Air Force with
an advantage over the Soviet Union? And can you cite specific examples
of combat aircraft systems that were in the inventory and operationally
used by the Air Force?

00:18:35

Richey: Well the Cold War goes up to about ’92, fall of the Berlin Wall
you said came down in ’89 and the dissolution of the Soviet Union in ’92,
so if we look at the period of the ‘60s, ‘70s, and ‘80s, there was a lot of
technology that resulted in Air Force systems having great superiority over
the Soviet class of aircraft. We were in what was called probably at least a
generation three fighter—now we’re in generation five with the JSF—but
the Soviets were probably in about generation two of turbine engine
fighter aircraft.
So in the ‘60s and ‘70s, we—the Air Force—had the F-111, and
then we had the F-16 and the F-15, Navy had the F-18 and the F-14. We
also brought in the bombers, the B-1 at that time, and these were far
superior, really, to anything the Soviets were doing. Soviets caught up to
some extent later, but up until 1990, the push on fighter aircraft resulted in
a combat edge, if you will, over the MiG-21, over some other Soviet
aircraft, the Flanker was coming in, the Su-27 was there. The MiG-29
hadn’t come in yet at that time. But the things that evolved this from the
laboratory was primarily propulsion—engines, superior engines. Also
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engines that had much more reliability at high power than anything the
Soviets had. They had some engines, but they’d burn out quick.
The other thing was in the flight control system, the fly-by-wire,
digital fly-by-wire and triplex redundant fly-by-wire, allowing the airplane
design to have negative static stability. With an analog system or
hydromechanical system, you had to have positive static stability because
the pilot couldn’t control the airplane. In the case of fly-by-wire, the
airplane is controlled by the computer. So that the airplane could be
designed for negative static stability, which means it’s much more agile
and so G’s can be pulled quickly. Now this blacked out the pilot in a few
cases, so we had to watch that—called G-induced loss of consciousness—
if you pull G’s too fast. Well, maybe the answer there is to take the pilot
out of the airplane. That’s another story. But in the ‘60s and ‘70s we had
the advent of the F-16 fly-by-wire, the F-15 with not as much reduced
static stability, but some. The F-16 had negative static stability, and it was
the first airplane to do that.
Along with the propulsion and the control system, there were
advancements along the way in aerodynamics of the wings, of the intake
and nozzle systems, refining both the inlet and the nozzle systems to be
more reliable, have higher performance, particularly at higher angles of
attack. And so we were getting our edge over the Soviets primarily in
terms of what we called close-in combat, which was within visual range
with hard maneuvering and setting up for a solution of either guns or
short-range missiles. If you have strictly long-range missiles, then this
maneuverability is not as important, but you still want some
maneuverability for self-defense. If you pick up the fact that a missile is
coming close, you want to hard maneuver to get away from it, and you do
not want your engine to stall while you’re doing maneuvers, either
offensively or defensively.
So in the technologies that we’re developing in the ‘60s and ‘70s
and into the ‘80s, we were going way ahead of what we knew the threat
was. But the idea was that, you know, we knew in some cases if we got
into combat we might be smaller in numbers than the adversary and would
have to make sure we could hold our own with respect to combat. And
combat simulations were going on, and there were several very important
red-flag simulations out at Nellis, in flight of threat-simulated aircraft. I
think they used F-5s, to simulate the MiG-21. And they were showing
that the U.S. aircraft were superior.
00:23:18
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00:23:48

Richey: Well, you can always speculate, but the MiG-29 and the Su
Sukhoi-27, have inlets underneath the wings, two inlets under the wings.
And so the flow over the airplane from the fuselage to the wings was kind
of straightened out or shielded as the flow, before the flow entered the
twin inlets beneath. The Flight Dynamics Laboratory in the early ‘60s,
late ‘60s, had investigated a series of air intakes in a program called
“Tailor-Mate.” It was done by General Dynamics down in Ft. Worth, and
they explored a wide variety of inlet-airframe combinations for tactical
aircraft. One of the configurations they studied was a single inlet beneath
the fuselage, again somewhat protected by the wing of this notional
aircraft. And that became the inlet for the F-16, and that legacy is quite
clear. A fellow by the name of Harry Hillaker, so-called “father of the F
16,” in print attributes the inlet system for the F-16 to the Flight Dynamics
Laboratory, and it’s based on the research that the group I ran did.
However, at the same we investigated this dual inlet for a dual
engine airplane. Well, the F-16, of course, is single engine, but this dual
inlet, both under the wings, shielded, was a very good system also. Well,
that is the inlet you see on the MiG-29 and the Su-27. How they got it, I
don’t know. There was some AIAA papers, which were cleared, which
showed the basic configurations, but we never published the detailed
performance data of those configurations, and of course I’ve not seen the
performance data on those inlets from the Soviet systems, but, boy, they
sure look a lot like that Tailor-Mate configuration that we did. So I think
they probably got the idea from those. And they also, then, seemed to
work pretty well. I’m not aware of any particular issues of compressor
stall with those airplanes.

00:26:23

Brown: In the 1950s, it was common to find articles describing the
weapon systems of the future of being missiles, robots, spacecraft,
unmanned aircraft. Did this perspective—perspective that seemed to
ignore the traditional manned aircraft—did this perspective inhibit the
laboratory’s work on technology for aeronautical systems? And was this a
vision that turned out to be correct?

00:26:51

Richey: Well, it didn’t impact our work. You know, these projections are
more or less the popular science kind of magazines or futurists, and
futurists sometimes are right and sometimes are wrong. But certainly in
the area of manned versus unmanned aircraft, in the ‘60s and ‘70s, we
knew that the Air Force would not be receptive to unmanned aircraft. The
technology wasn’t there, and of course, the Air Force, as always, is run by
fighter pilots, and, you know, unless they have a terrifically good reason,
they are not going to take the pilot out of the airplane. But, of course,
there were missiles. Missiles had been developed throughout the Cold
War, and very capable missiles—the Sidewinder, and later on, the AIM
120 missile and other long range missiles—were very good for combat.
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But as far as the tone of aeronautical research, these things you mentioned
didn’t have much of an impact. The guidance and the direction from the
Air Force was pretty clear that they wanted to advance the front of combat
aircraft—fighters, and bombers, and maybe even transports, to some
extent—with manned systems, with more or less conventional wisdom as
far as airplane design is concerned. They didn’t have much of an effect.
Now were these futurists correct? Second part of your question.
Well, they might have been. We’re now in the 1990s and 2000s entering
into a new era of unmanned aircraft. We see them first of all in the
intelligence and reconnaissance area. For example, the Global Hawk,
which can stay up for thirty or so hours and beyond normal endurance of a
pilot in an aircraft. And you don’t need a pilot if you’re just doing the ISR
(reconnaissance) business. So that was something that might have been
talked about way back when. Of course there’s been drone aircraft for
years, and even the Kettering Bug from here in Dayton, Ohio, was an early
unmanned system. So that, you know, some of the things that you
mentioned—robots and unmanned—could be in the future, but it’s a long
time coming.
00:29:24

Brown: If we could stay on the theme for a moment of the future and
certainly technology is always looking to the future, periodically the Air
Force sponsored technology forecasting exercises. Were you ever a
participant in one of these exercises, and if so, did you regard them as
effective?

00:29:46

Richey: I was a participant in two. In Forecast One, which was in the
early ‘60s, I was a provider of some information, but not a direct
participant. We had people in Forecast One which was conducted on the
West Coast, and we would mail them data. This was before fax machines
even, and we would mail them data overnight, and they would consider it
in their activities out there. A fellow named Al Draper from the
laboratory, a real visionary, was on Forecast One. He had to do with
primarily the high-speed things of Forecast One.
Cut to the chase in 1986, Forecast Two, and I was the panel
director of the Air Vehicle panel for the Forecast Two, so I was a direct
participant in that 1986 timeframe. And I’ll never forget when the
Challenger blew up in January of ‘86, we were in Washington on Forecast
Two, and, boy, that was a shock. And so in ’86, I was the director of the
part of Forecast Two that had to do with air vehicles, a group of about
eight or ten people, and now we were receiving, now electronically in ’86,
information back from the field on ideas, technologies, assessments,
analysis, and so forth, to make our projections in ’86.
Now as regard to effectiveness, I think Forecast One was more
effective than Forecast Two. Because Forecast One, even though I was a
worker-bee and didn’t have visibility of the top leadership of the Air
Force, for example General Schriever, there was the backing of the
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Systems Command to Forecast One, and there was the backing of the
Chief of Staff and the Secretary of the Air Force on Forecast One. And
they were going to implement as many as they could of the systems that
were forecast. So out of Forecast One came the C-5 and several other
systems, and composites technology was promoted by Forecast One.
Forecast Two was a lot more diverse and didn’t have the total
backing of the Chief and Secretary. It had the backing of Systems
Command (General Larry Skantze was Systems Command Commander at
the time) and he had full backing of the programs that were coming out.
But it didn’t really have kind of the buy-in from senior AF leaders that
seemed to be there in Forecast One. So the lineage of current systems
here in 2006, twenty years after Forecast Two, is much more diverse.
However, we in the Air Vehicle panel of Forecast Two, forecasted
things like high-altitude, long-endurance reconnaissance aircraft; we
talked about solar power, but we also talked about other propulsion
schemes, and now you have Global Hawk. We also talked in Forecast
Two about short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) fighters, and now
you have the JSF STOVL variant with the Marine Corps, and the Air
Force is even considering buying some of the STOVL-type of joint-strike
fighter F-35 for the Air Force. It’s still in the consideration stage. They
haven’t done it. But some of the things that we forecasted in ’86 such as
the high-altitude, long-endurance, the STOVL, and the high-speed missile,
we talked about are starting to come to pass. But not so much as a direct
result of being in Forecast Two, more from the needs, the development,
and the opportunity for systems development.
There was one negative example which came out of Forecast Two,
and that was the National Aerospace Plane. I was on Forecast Two panel,
as I said, and we forecasted that eventually, a single-stage to orbit space
plane could be possible. But we put it somewhere around 2025. This is
1986 now, because we knew the difficulties of the technology. And, well
this caught the idea of General Skantze, and in ’87 and ’88 then, he
instituted the N-A-S-P, or NASP program. And he and I had some
conversations about this, and I said, “General, keep in mind that we
forecasted this would be around 2025,” particularly because of propulsion
and materials and other technologies just wasn’t going to be ready. And
single-stage to orbit is a tough nut to crack. Everything has to work just
right, in a finite size airplane, to be able to take off horizontally, go into
orbit, return, land horizontally. That was the aerospace plane concept. So
I said, “General, you know, it just isn’t there.” And he says, “Keith, don’t
bother me with details. We’re going to do this.” So I said, “All right, sir,
I will support it to the best of my ability.” Well, as you know, three or
four years later, reality had set in, and the NASP was cancelled, and it was
unfortunate. So we’re still dealing with some of the backlash of things
like that.
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00:35:18

Brown: The future never quite turns out to be what we expect it to be, and
on many occasions, the Air Force has been surprised at how events have
unfolded and requirements have developed. A particular example is the
conflict in Southeast Asia, the Vietnam War. That conflict created
unanticipated demands for the Air Force. What was the effect on
laboratory programs, the consequences of this conflict, and did it demand
new technologies?

00:35:51

Richey: The main conflict and the impact of the Vietnam was in the area
of survivability and particularly due to small arms fire and new surface-to
air missiles. You know, it was a war where the airplanes in some cases
had to get down pretty low to see the targets and to identify the targets for
close-air support of the ground troops. And like Iraq, you know, there
wasn’t enemy here and friendlies there. It was a guerilla type warfare. So
they were down in the area of small-arms fire, and if you throw up enough
bullets, you can bring down an airplane. So we saw an increased
emphasis in the laboratory on hardening aircraft and armor and redundant
systems, so an airplane could “take a licking and keep on ticking,” as we
used to say. And so that, even if it took small arms fire, it could come
back and be repaired. And that was one impact.
The other impact was that in North Korea, North Vietnam, there
were pretty capable SAM sites, and so that we saw increased emphasis on
defensive systems and other systems for the missiles that were working
against the guys going in to Hanoi. That kind of spun back in my case to
the case of the F-111. The F-111 first flew in 1964 with the Vietnam War
going on in Southeast Asia. And they wanted to get it into operation as
soon as possible into the Vietnamese theater. And so there was quite an
accelerated development of the F-111 as a tactical system. It was
designed to replace the F-105. As I said before, it had terrain-following
radar, so it was to provide survivability by very high speed. The original
design was even Mach 1.2 on the deck. It turned out that was a stretch,
but the idea was to go very fast at low level to avoid the defenses, and that
was partly as a result of the Southeast Asia situation, in a more general
sense, the Cold War, if you will. But the F-111, then, had to go through
quite an accelerated development.
As it turned out, it had uncovered, for the first time, a serious inletengine compatibility problem. In other words, the inlet was delivering
distorted flow. It turned out to be time-dependent distorted flow to the
engine, and the engine would stall (compressor stall) during maneuvers,
even during hard accelerations, and during supersonic flight. It was kind
of like driving a car, and it just quits on you. And it may restart in a few
seconds, but, you know, it really gets the attention of the pilot when one or
both engines quit. And so there was quite a push for several months,
about eighteen months, on improving the characteristics of the F-111 inlet
system.
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It turned out what they missed was the fact that the flow coming
into the engine at the compressor phase was time-dependent. It was
unsteady. And the evaluations as to what flow distortion the engine could
take were based on time-average, steady-state descriptions of the flow.
But in fact the flow was unsteady, and if the flow would only be distorted
at a peak high enough for the engine to make one revolution, as far as the
engine was concerned, that was a steady state, and it would stall. And so
what we were missing, before we got into it, was the fact that the flow was
unsteady, and we had to put instrumentation at the compressor face to
describe the unsteady flow distortion.
Once we did that, then we could say, the engine is stalling about
where it should stall on its distortion margin, and so we just have to work
to beat down the unsteady part of the flow and make it more smoother
overall, with not as many peaks and valleys of distortion. But we were
kind of in the dark. We were looking at something that was going on, but
we couldn’t see it, because the instrumentation was too slow. So when we
put in instrumentation in the airplane, both in wind tunnel tests and flight
tests, then we discovered that the real distortion that was important was
over a fraction of a second. That’s compared to a steady-state operation.
So with the problems with inlet-engine compatibility, after ’66,
’67, the Air Force turned around and said, “We can’t afford to have those
kinds of issues again in a new airplane system, so we need increased
emphasis in the inlet-distortion research.” There were also some problems
with the drag of the F-111 in the backend, and the Air Force said also,
“We can’t afford to have these kind of drag problems of the nozzle system
in future aircraft, so we need to do some research in that area.” So in the
late ‘60s and early ‘70s, then, the Flight Dynamics Laboratory and the
group that I led emphasized almost exclusively transonic, supersonic, up
to Mach 2.5, kinds of propulsion integration issues, and we dropped out
completely of anything hypersonic. We dropped out of anything else,
because that was the need of the systems. Driven by Cold War, driven by
where the Air Force was going in the development of the F-15. The F-15
inlet development was based on what we had learned in the F-111, in the
fact that McDonnell was then able to develop an inlet system for the F-15
which was pretty much trouble-free, partly based on analysis of timedependent distortion developed by the Flight Dynamics Lab.
00:42:12

24 August 2006

Brown: Your remarks on the problems of the F-111 inlet and the ultimate
success in resolving the Air Force’s concern about the technology base for
future systems, raises a question about transition of technology into
products and the issue of identifying a customer for the technologies of the
laboratories. From your perspective, who represented the customer base
for the Wright Field laboratories – were they the program offices, the
SPOs, the contractors, the user, the operational command such as Tactical
Air Command, Strategic Air Command—can you enlighten us on the
customer base of the transition issue?
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Richey: Well, the customer for the advanced technologies we were
developing would have been primarily the people in the Aeronautical
Systems Division at the time who looked into the future, the so-called
Development Planning, or XR organization, within ASD. The SPOs were
pretty much interested in their day-to-day problems. If they had an issue,
like in the F-111, then the SPO engineers and the lab engineers would
work together to address the issue, and that was the case of the F-111.
For advanced systems, when we were working on advanced inlets
and nozzles and aerodynamics and so forth, we would work quite a bit
with the development planning organization. A fellow named John
Chuprun, a world-class designer, a good friend of mine, would work with
us and say, “This is the kind of systems we’re considering for the future in
the Air Force, and here’s where we need advancements in technology and
can you guys help us to push those areas?” It might be performance or
weight or cost or whatever it was, and so we were taking a lot of our cues
from the people in the Aeronautical Systems Division, the airplane
business of the Air Force, that were looking in the future. We in the
laboratory were looking at the components of the airplane, but they were
looking at the total system, and they gave us signposts that we would try
to develop our technology for.
The other customer was the using commands, the Air Combat
command, for example, and we would go down and talk to them from
time to time and try to get their encouragement of our projects at the
senior level of the Air Force, so that when Air Force budgets came up for
review, we always wanted to have the commander of Air Combat
Command telling the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or the budgeteers,
“This is important stuff and you need to keep it up.” So we wanted them
in our corner, and we wanted to try to be responsive to their view of the
future. And of course the combat commands such as Air Combat
Command or Strategic Air Command always had their future operations
shops, requirements operations divisions, which to some extent looked in
the future also. It was primarily wherever in the Air Force we could find
somebody that was looking at the future, we considered them our
customer.

End of Video Tape One
[on audio file only
00:49:06

Brown: At this time, we’ll take a break for a few moments before we
resume the interview.

00:49:08

Richey: All right. ]
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Start of Video Tape Two
00:00:00

Brown: Dr. Richey, the knowledge and skills of individual specialists in
the laboratories are critical for advancing technologies. How did the Air
Force laboratories recruit and maintain a competent workforce? And do
government policies promote the objective of maintaining this competent
workforce?

00:00:27

Richey: Well, the recruiting, of course, depends on the budget of the lab,
and there are cycles when there are more resources available for
recruiting. There’s times when the resources are not available so the
recruiting pretty much goes to a low level.
Let’s talk about times when there is ability to recruit. There was
such a time in the early ‘60s. There was another time in the late ‘60s, and
another time in probably the mid-‘70s, and then later on in about the mid
‘80s. There were cycles of staff build-up and recruiting. I would be
involved with recruiting trips to universities. We primarily would present
to the graduates the ability to take on responsibilities earlier on by working
for the government laboratories, to be involved with something that was
cutting edge, number one. We explained that it was applied research in
most cases. They wouldn’t be, you know, white-coat laboratory-type
people. For instance, those students who had kind of an interest in design,
a broad background of aeronautical work; we explained to them early in
their career take a broad look at the field. Whereas if they were in a
company, they might only see that company’s aspect, a fairly narrow
view.
So we would tell students, “Come to us for five years and get the
broad view. At that time, if you want to go to an industry, fine. You go
with our backing.” But in many cases, they got so interested in the broad
view and the idea that they were guiding technology, guiding large
contracts, and guiding teams of researchers within the lab that they would
stay.
Paywise, we always told the engineers, particularly in the ‘60s and
‘70s, you might start out a little bit low, but after five or ten years, you
should catch up with your peers. So as far as the development was
concerned, the environment was relatively good. The policies that upper
management would put on were not particularly onerous. I think in most
cases, the engineers understood that there were budget cuts, there were
issues with promotions that wouldn’t always come when they were
wanted, but they enjoyed the work. And we would oftentimes, when I was
Chief Scientist, meet with other chief scientists and we could walk about
“psychic income.” You have fiscal income and you have psychic income.
As long as we can keep the total of fiscal and psychic above the fiscal with
opportunities outside the lab, we will be able to retain our people and be
able to keep them motivated. So we as leaders, chief scientists, would
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work to create an environment that was conducive to collegial research, to
fun work, and to the idea of making a contribution that they couldn’t make
in another industry.
00:03:43

Brown: When you visited a campus on a recruiting trip, were you
interested in recruiting specific specialists, specific knowledge
backgrounds? Or was your objective simply to get the best qualified
person whatever their interest?

00:04:02

Richey: It was more the latter. We would hire in to engineering
specialties, such as aeronautical, electrical, mechanical. I would have
been mostly involved with the aeronautical engineering graduates. So we
would particularly emphasize the top-level schools across the country.
We knew that we probably had our best chance of recruiting if we stayed
in the Midwest, because, it’s difficult to get someone to move from the
West Coast to the Midwest, with all the bad weather and everything. But
certainly there are many very good aeronautical universities in the
Midwest—Purdue, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio State, Case Western—within
five hundred miles of Wright-Patterson. So we would go to those
universities and recruit the highest G.P.A. we could, the top of the class, as
near as we could, and try and induce them to, as I said before, come to the
lab. As I said before, we’d also then discuss with them the opportunities
for graduate study, part-time or full-time, so if they wanted to pursue their
educational career further, that the Air Force was very interested and
supportive in advanced education.
But we didn’t look for someone who had a particular skill, at least
when I was recruiting. I think later on, they might have recruited more for
people who were coming out of the university with a computational fluid
dynamics background or something like that. But in general, when I was
recruiting in the ‘60s, and ‘70s, and ‘80s, we said “Bring good people in,
then we’ll train them.”

00:05:45

Brown: The work force in the laboratories is an interesting combination
of military and civilian personnel. Can you please describe the reason for
this arrangement? And did you regard it as an effective way to staff an
R&D organization?

00:06:01

Richey: I always felt that the mix of military and civilian was good, and
that the military, particularly the military leaders, fellows who’d been in
an operational command, perhaps even combat, could give us some good
insight, some good guidance. We didn’t expect them to be the brains of
the outfit, necessarily, but we appreciated their leadership, we appreciated
their experience and I think, they were effective in helping to guide our
research. In most cases, they were in the management chain and so they
were good advocates with the users, the people in Air Combat Command,
the officers at Systems Command. And we always said that if we’re going

24 August 2006

16

Cold War Aerospace Technology History Project

G. Keith Richey

to visit a using command, we need a “blue suit” with us, who would talk
in terms of operational needs and leave the technical details to the civilian
engineers. We were probably at least eighty-five percent civilian, fifteen
percent military. I think even now, it’s even less that in military, but the
leadership, I think, is good.
The down side of it is that the leadership, for example at the lab
director level, would change quite frequently, so that you had change
every eighteen months or so. So you had a change of leadership style or a
change of leadership point of view, but in the end, you could average that
out, and we kind of worked through it. Sometimes a project would have
difficulty if a particular lab director didn’t like it for some reason or
another, but we’d kind of put those projects in the bottom left-hand
drawer, as we called it, and then bring them back out when another
director came in and we thought we could sell it again, so we kind of kept
the corporate memory. But I think, overall, it was beneficial to have a
mix. I don’t think all military or all civilian would either be a good idea.
00:08:09

Brown: The laboratories at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base have a
heritage that goes back into World War I, the foundings of McCook Field
and the Engineering Division, and that results in a culture with a very long
memory, and certain unusual characteristics, a culture that is perhaps
different from what you would find any where else. How would you
define the culture of the work environment within the laboratories at
Wright Field?

00:08:40

Richey: Well the culture, I think in my experience, was favorable. We
worked with a lot of very good people. We had good leaders in the Flight
Dynamics Laboratory, where I spent basically all my career, at the branch
and laboratory level. Some commanders were more effective than others
but they all were good leaders. And I think the culture was generally
favorable. We didn’t feel like we were oppressed in any way. We had
enough resources for our in-house research, for contracts, for travel, for
participating in professional societies. We were able to go to conferences
and symposia when we needed to. Promotions for the most part came
when they were deserved. We’d go through periods of time when they
would try to, you know, count things that didn’t need to be counted as far
as promotions were concerned, but we eventually got back over to the
point where we had kind of a mentoring process, where senior people in
the laboratory would kind of informally mentor, or take under their wing,
some of the younger engineers. I was fortunate to have people like Mr.
Philip Antonatos as my mentor, and Mr. Al Draper as one of my other
mentors. They were senior leaders at the division level in the Flight
Dynamics Lab, and we would go with them and interact with the lab
commander. And even if the lab commander changed, they knew that
when either Mr. Antonatos or Mr. Draper would bring us younger
engineers along that it was for a reason, and they would listen to us. I
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think the culture was good. It was collegial. I don’t recall any particularly
oppressive or negative environments.
00:10:39

Brown: Let me ask you to shift your perspective from internally within
the laboratories to the outside world, and particularly to higher
headquarters and the Pentagon. Through the decades of the Cold War,
several men served as Secretary of Defense, were remembered for
initiatives that changed how weapon systems are developed and acquired.
Did the office of the Secretary of Defense have a particularly significant
influence on the Air Force laboratories, and do you regard any particular
secretaries as having been effective?

00:11:18

Richey: Well, a lot of that was above my pay grade, as you might say.
You know, we would see the budgets go up and down, and of course that
was somewhat dependent on the Secretary of Defense support of
technologies. I think most of the Secretaries of Defense were favorable to
technology, but a lot of them wanted to have more of a near-term return on
the investment and push the technology bar back to more of a near-term
approach, say ten years out versus twenty-five years out, something like
that. So there’d be some changes and some perturbations as the
secretaries changed. I never met, myself, with the Secretary of Defense,
although in the case of the F-111, we knew that Mr. McNamara was
extremely interested in the F-111 and was being reported to on the F-111
every Saturday morning in the Pentagon, with a program that was called
“Project Icarus,” which is a mythological character whose wings were
made of wax and melted when he got too close to the sun. So it was kind
of ironic that the F-111, which was having problems of flight, would be
called “Project Icarus.” But we saw the influence at that level of Secretary
McNamara on the engineering work at the contractor and then our support
of that problem with the F-111 in the ’66, ’67 time frame. I have recorded
some of this in a Systems Engineering case study for the F-111 that I did a
couple of years ago, and I gave you a copy of it, Squire.

00:13:02

Brown: Thank you. So your professional career covered not only decades
at the height of the Cold War, but you were there when the Cold War
came to an end, an end that seems, in retrospect, rather swift, rather
abrupt, beginning with the withdrawal of the Soviet forces from Eastern
Europe in 1989, and finally the political disintegration of the Soviet Union
in 1992. Did the Air Force anticipate the collapse of the Soviet Union and
the end of the Cold War? Did you personally foresee the end of the Cold
War?

00:13:43

Richey: No, I didn’t foresee it personally. You know, I would follow the
news, but I was surprised that it really did happen. As far as I could tell,
the Air Force didn’t communicate to us in the lab one way or the other
whether they were surprised about that or not. But it changed the impetus
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of research to some extent; we were involved in ’91, ’92 in the First Gulf
War, and that had a lot of impact on the lab budgets because the Air Force
needed more money to fight the war, so there was a decrease in both
people and fiscal resources in the laboratories. And we used to call the
‘60s and ‘70s the “Golden Age” of research in the labs. In ’91, ’92, of
course, with the dimunition of the Soviet Union and the Gulf War, less
emphasis on research, there was significant manpower cuts in the early
‘90s, and the Wright Laboratory—five directorates here now at Air Force
Research Lab—was reduced by about a third over that time frame. And
during that time, I was Chief Scientist of the Wright Laboratory (five
directorates) here. Later on I was Director of Plans and Programs for
Wright Lab, and from ’95-’97, Director of what is now the Air Vehicles
Directorate, at that time Flight Dynamics Directorate. And so we were
under quite a bit of pressure because the Soviet Union had disintegrated,
we were in a war with Iraq and other issues in Southwest Asia and so we
were fighting the battles of budget and personnel. Morale was good at that
time, but we at the senior leadership level (I was a leader at that time) had
to really advocate our laboratory and advocate the research we were doing
and sometimes had to adjust to rather significant personnel and budget
cuts. And on occasion, I would visit the commander of then Air Force
Wright Aeronautic Laboratories, AFWAL, at his home on Saturday
afternoon and get my point of view across.
00:16:22

Brown: From this post-Cold War perspective, if you were speaking to a
future historian, how would you describe the significance of Wright Field
during the Cold War?

00:16:36

Richey: Well, during the Cold War, I was involved with the laboratories
from ’61 up to the end of the Cold War, which we’ll say is 1991, ’92. And
so during that time frame, it was in most cases, a robust time of research
for the lab, whether it was the Soviet threat or just the need for advancing
technology. We were under the leadership a lot of that time from General
Bernard Schriever. He was a giant of advocacy for technology, and wellrespected by each successive Chief of Staff, each successive Secretary of
the Air Force, and when General Schriever spoke, people listened. And he
was the one in the ‘60s and ‘70s who really kept technology going. I had
the privilege of meeting him several times, and in the ’66 time frame, I
was involved in a study on the west coast called Beyond the Horizon. It
was kind of a follow-on to the von Kármán study, Toward New Horizons.
It was run by General Schriever, and he was such a prince, a brilliant man,
and a strong advocate of technology. We’ve not had one since at Systems
Command. We’ve had very good Systems Command leaders, but we’ve
never had a Schriever.

00:18:19

Brown: As we close this interview, Dr. Richey, is there anything else that
you would like to mention, perhaps something that we’ve not addressed
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through the questions themselves? Any other perspective that you would
like to share with us please?
00:18:33

24 August 2006

Richey: Well, I’ve had a great career, and I was very fortunate to have
had that career. Good support of my family throughout, a lot of travel,
and my wife was very supportive in all aspects of my career with the Air
Force.
I think the thing that I get back to in the laboratory is the people,
and the people who were visionaries. In the laboratory, we think of Bill
Lamar and Phil Antonatos, Zip Zonars, Al Draper, some of the other
people, many who have now passed on, who were visionary, who were
good leaders, and who encouraged the younger engineers such as myself.
We had good lab directors, I think of Bob Barlow and George Cudahay, a
very dynamic and somewhat unpredictable man, but always had some
good ideas. Brian Dale Ward, who strangely enough, I got along with
very well; he was a bit of a terror, but somehow Colonel Ward and I got
along all right, and he helped to get me in some of my senior positions,
and so we struck it off good for some reason or another. But basically the
people; if you think back on your career, the budgets come, the budgets
go. The facilities come, facilities go. But if you can have good people,
and good leaders who will, number one, listen to their subordinates and
advocate the programs that the subordinate teams are going to be pushing,
such as the two-dimensional nozzle on the F-22; work that led up to the
advanced inlets systems, the advanced structural concepts, some of the
hypersonics. Al Draper was a leader, a pioneer in the lifting body research,
a lot of which resulted in application to the space shuttle and also to
maneuvering re-entry vehicles. Good ideas were advocated, good ideas
were supported by the people there, and the budgets would be applied as
best they could. Some things worked, some things didn’t, but there was
never reprisal for failure. There was always “what did we learn and what
can we go from here,” and I think the laboratory was in a mode of taking
some risk, that we need to be careful as we go into the future that we’re
not so risk-averse that we’re not able to take some flyers on technologies
and try a few things that might not work. You know, if we’re in kind of a
cost-accounting mind-set that we have to show the application and the
favorable outcome for everything, we will not pursue some ideas that
would be useful.
You had talked to Bill Bahret about stealth, and that was, of
course, one of the keystone technologies in the Cold War. But you know
without people backing ideas like Bill’s work up in “The Barn” on stealth,
it wouldn’t have come to pass, because Secretary Bill Perry, I think maybe
he was Undersecretary of Defense, was an early advocate of stealth, and
I’m sure Bill mentioned that, but, you know, it wasn’t widely known. So
that you weren’t getting top down direction from the leadership on things
like that. But, as I said earlier, in the case of General Schriever, you were
getting top-down advocacy and top-down guidance for a broad scope of
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technologies, and then he would leave it up to the lab engineers and lab
managers and leaders to do the best they could to promote that. So I think
the laboratory has to maintain an environment of collegial relationships. It
has to maintain an environment of advocating for its people and its
programs, and don’t get too wrapped up in organizations or too wrapped
up in bean counting and things like that. The laboratory has to remember
it’s a technology development organization and everything isn’t going to
work. But some things will, and when they work, it’s great.
00:23:14

Brown: This concludes our interview with Dr. Richey. Thank you for
your time this morning. It’s been a pleasure.

00:23:19

Richey: Thanks, Squire.

End of Video Tape Two
End of Interview One
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